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Abstract
This paper provides the first comparative analysis of nuclear reactor
construction costs in France and the United States. Studying the cost of
nuclear power has often been a challenge, owing to the lack of reliable
data sources and heterogeneity between countries, as well as the long time
horizon which requires controlling for input prices and structural changes.
We build a simultaneous system of equations for overnight costs and
construction time (lead-time) to control for endogeneity, using expected
demand variation as an instrument. We argue that benefits from
nuclear reactor program standardization can arise through short term
coordination gains, when the diversity of nuclear reactors’ technologies
under construction is low, or through long term benefits from learning
spillovers from past reactor construction experience, if those spillovers
are limited to similar reactors. We find that overnight construction costs
benefit directly from learning spillovers but that these spillovers are only
significant for nuclear models built by the same Architect-Engineer (A-
E). In addition, we show that the standardization of nuclear reactors
under construction has an indirect and positive effect on construction
costs through a reduction in lead-time, the latter being one of the main
drivers of construction costs. Conversely, we also explore the possibility of
learning by searching and find that, contrary to other energy technologies,
innovation leads to construction costs increases
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1 Introduction
Many countries have asserted their interest in building nuclear power plants
either to ensure security of energy supply, meet CO2 emission reduction
targets, or both. This is the case for China, the Czech Republic, India,
Poland, Turkey, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) (IAEA,
2012). Nevertheless, uncertainties surrounding construction costs of new
nuclear reactors, along with risks associated with changes in the regulatory
framework, have raised doubts about the competitiveness of this technology in
both developed and developing countries and led to diﬃculties for the ﬁnancing
of nuclear new-build projects (Nuttall and Taylor, 2009).
The construction costs of nuclear reactors are particularly important for
the competitiveness of nuclear power for two reasons. Firstly, nuclear power is
a base-load electricity source with a construction time of, on average, 7.4 years
in OECD countries (See Table 4 in Section 4). As such, construction costs can
represent between 60 to 80% of the levelized cost of nuclear power (IEA, 2010).
Secondly, there is still a sense of agreement that building the ﬁrst reactor of a
new design will come with speciﬁc ﬁxed costs. In that respect, the rationale for
building this ﬁrst reactor -and sometimes the associated subsidies- is motivated
by the assumption that construction costs will decrease as the industry beneﬁts
from learning eﬀects
These risks and uncertainties are reﬂected in recent construction experience
in OECD countries. For instance, while the initial cost estimate made by
the French nuclear utility Electricité de France (EDF) in 2009 for the EPR
nuclear reactor in Flamanville (France) was close to e3 billion (i.e. 2000
Ke2010/MWe), the latest announcement indicates that the costs may have
nearly tripled, up to e8.5 billion (i.e., 5100 Ke2010/MWe)
1, and similar costs
are expected for the EPR construction in Finland. In turn, other countries
such as the UK, which have been considering the adoption of this technology,
are reluctant to do so precisely because the costs estimates have increased
and there remain large uncertainties about the possibility for EDF to derive
learning by doing beneﬁts from its current reactor’s construction for future
projects.
Despite the signiﬁcance of construction costs for nuclear power competitive
margins, the economic literature has so far failed to provide clear empirical
evidence of the determinants of these costs and the existence of learning eﬀects,
mainly due to the lack of comparable and reliable data. In particular, data
on construction costs for the French nuclear program were only published in
2012 (Cour des Comptes (2012)). Before this date, existing estimates (Grubler,
2010), were based on extrapolations of annual investment expenditures of EDF.
1 EDF Press Release 12/03/2012 (last accessed 10 June 2013): http://press.edf.com/press-
releases/all-press-releases/2012/flamanville-epr-costs-revised-still-on-schedule-93875.html
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Most of the existing econometric studies have used data on US construction
costs and attribute the escalation in costs to the increase in complexity of new
reactors. Many authors argue that the experience gained by nuclear vendors
led to the design of bigger and more complex reactors that took longer lead-
times to construct and required closer regulatory monitoring (Komanoﬀ (1981),
Zimmerman (1982), Rothwell (1986), Cantor and Hewlett (1988) and Cooper
(2012)). In the case of the French nuclear program, Grubler (2010) argues
in favour of a negative learning by doing eﬀect, whereas Escobar-Rangel and
Leveque (2012) ﬁnd evidence of learning within speciﬁc reactor models.
It is also generally accepted that the heterogeneity in the nuclear ﬂeet and
the multiplicity of vendors and utilities did not create the gains of learning by
doing. David and Rothwell (1996)argue that the lack of standardization in the
nuclear US ﬂeet entailed ≪ ballooning≫ of construction costs, although some
positive learning eﬀects are found by Cantor and Hewlett (1988) and McCabe
(1996) for construction projects managed by utilities.
In this paper, we propose the ﬁrst empirical investigation of the role of
standardization and learning opportunities on nuclear reactors’ construction
costs, using historical cost data from the US and France. This choice is
motivated by the fact that these two countries have followed diﬀerent paths in
terms of industrial structure and technological diversity. For instance, while
in the US several ﬁrms have acted as Architect-Engineer (A-E) and vendors
of nuclear reactors, these roles have been the responsibility of the utility EDF
and Areva (formerly Framatome) in France, respectively. Similarly, if the
two countries have both built Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR), France has
implemented fewer technological variations compared to the US. This means
that by looking at French and US experience together one can beneﬁt from
more heterogeneity in the data in order to derive robust estimates.
Our empirical strategy follows those of Rothwell (1986) and Cantor
and Hewlett (1988), where a simultaneous equation model is estimated for
construction costs and lead-time using US data. However, our analysis
tackles a number of other empirical shortcomings. Firstly, our study allows
direct comparison of nuclear reactors’ overnight construction costs in the
two countries using the access to data2 on engineering and other related
expenditures for French reactors, which are not detailed in the Cour des
Comptes (2012) report. Secondly, we use an IV approach, using the expected
demand as an instrument for lead-time (Cantor and Hewlett, 1988), and also
test the hypothesis that some of the beneﬁts of standardization may have an
indirect impact on cost through a reduction in lead-time. Thirdly, we consider
two potential beneﬁts of nuclear programs standardization: (i) standardization
2 These data on overnight construction costs have been made available to the authors by
EDF. As such they differ slightly from the data available in the Cour des Comptes’ report
where expenditure regarding engineering work, pre-operating expenses, etc. are presented
at an aggregated level
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can have short term beneﬁts on costs reductions through reduced diversity of
designs for reactors under construction, leading to coordination gains; and (ii)
standardization may also allow long term beneﬁts through learning by doing
spillovers from similar units built previously. In order to capture these spillover
eﬀects we diﬀerentiate spillovers based on reactor models and A-E ﬁrms.
In addition, the literature and policy debate has so far essentially focused on
the role of experience through the study of learning by doing eﬀects, in nuclear
construction cost reduction. However, considering the importance of public
R&D expenditures on nuclear power, an equally important policy question
would be the inﬂuence of learning by searching. For instance, for many energy
technologies, learning by searching has been highlighted as an important driver
of energy cost reduction.
In the nuclear power sector, evidence of a positive learning by searching
eﬀect has only been found using cost and innovation data from energy
economics modelling tools (Jamasb, 2007). In that respect, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no existing literature that has looked at this eﬀect
using existing cost data. Hence, our study is the ﬁrst to bring together data
on nuclear power overnight construction costs and knowledge capabilities data,
using original data from nuclear reactors’ costs in the US and in France, and
a measure of the stock of knowledge based on patent data.
Our results suggest that standardization of nuclear reactors programs is one
of the main factors in limiting costs escalation and takes place at two levels.
Firstly, standardization beneﬁts are found to originate from coordination gains
induced by the diversity of reactors under construction. However, this eﬀect
impacts costs indirectly through a reduction in lead-time, which has a strong
and signiﬁcant impact on costs. This result is also conﬁrmed in other OECD
countries with diﬀerent market structure and technological paths.
Secondly, we ﬁnd that learning by doing spillovers also relate to some long
term beneﬁts of standardization, considering that these spillovers are limited to
nuclear models built by the same A-E ﬁrm. This highlights the importance of
reactor design standardization and the role played by the A-E ﬁrm in reducing
construction costs increases.
On the other hand, we show that contrary to other energy technologies
(Erickson and Drennen, 2006) there is a negative eﬀect of learning by searching
on reactors’ overnight construction costs. This can be explained by the fact
that innovation in nuclear power technologies has been driven by nuclear
safety considerations (Berthélemy, 2012a), leading to safer but more expensive
nuclear reactors.
These results suggest paths for future cost reductions through greater
standardization of reactor technologies and more emphasis on the role of A-E
ﬁrms in improving the competitiveness of nuclear power. In parallel, from a
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policy perspective one may argue that lead-time will play a more important role
under a liberalized electricity market, where higher discount rates may apply,
meaning that the competitiveness of nuclear power will be more conditional
on the standardization of nuclear programs.
The ensuing sections of this paper are organized as follows: in Section 2 we
present our research hypotheses along with stylized facts on the development
and cost experience of nuclear power in the US and France; Section 3
describes our empirical strategy and the results; Section 4 further investigates
international experiences with nuclear power construction using a larger
dataset on nuclear power lead-time; and ﬁnally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Main hypotheses, data and stylized facts
2.1 Main hypotheses on the relation between construction
costs and lead-times
The construction of nuclear reactors is a complex process and requires
the coordination of several ﬁrms, subject to monitoring and regulation from
a nuclear safety regulator prior to, during and after the construction stage.
Typically, following or not a tender, an electricity generation ﬁrm (hereafter
the utility) places an order for the construction of a nuclear reactor and
selects a speciﬁc reactor design oﬀered by a nuclear vendor. This construction
is then managed by an A-E ﬁrm which supervises the construction and
coordinates the multiple ﬁrms involved in the project. This includes the
constructor, the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) manufacturer, the
turbine manufacturer, as well as a number of subcontractors. The allocation of
ﬁrms’ responsibilities may diﬀer between projects and, for instance, the utility
may decide to also be the A-E (as it is the case in France and sometimes in
the US).
One consequence of the involvement of multiple ﬁrms in the project is that
the objective functions of these ﬁrms may diﬀer (Rothwell, 1986). In particular,
the A-E ﬁrm will minimize costs, whereas the utility will aim to maximize the
net present value of the project. This means that the lead-time of the project
becomes a decision variable for the utility as, for instance, it can decide to
spend more on construction costs in order to reduce the construction period
and derive revenue sooner.
From an empirical point of view, the construction cost will be determined
by these two objective functions and will be jointly determined with lead-time,
leading to a simultaneity problem and lead-time to enter into the cost equation.
The inclusion of lead-time in the cost equation can be further motivated by the
fact that there exists additional ﬁxed costs associated with longer construction
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periods, for instance, as utilities are generally in charge of project ﬁnancing
and due to immobilized construction equipment and labour force.
Consequently, OLS estimators will be biased. One solution consists of using
an instrument variable approach in order to regain consistency. Our empirical
strategy follows this approach with national expected demand (EDemi) of
electricity in country c as an instrument for lead-time (Cantor and Hewlett,
1988), considering that future demand impacts the net present value of the
project but does not inﬂuence current construction costs.
Our baseline model speciﬁcation follows equations (1) and (2) where Xi
is a vector of independent variables which can impact both cost (CTi) and
lead-time (LTi) and will be further presented in the next sub-section:
CTi = α0 + α1LTi +
J∑
j=2
αjXij + υi (1)
LTi = β0 + β1EDemi +
J∑
j=2
βjXij + ǫi (2)
2.2 Data and hypotheses regarding the effects of standardiza-
tion and learning opportunities
Data have been collected from a variety of sources. As mentioned in
the introduction, overnight construction costs are collected from the Cour
des Comptes (2012) report, and adjustments have been made to account
for engineering costs using additional data from EDF. For the US, overnight
construction costs data have been published in the online Appendix of Koomey
and Hultman (2007).
However, the US costs data are still more detailed as they take place at
the reactor level, whereas the French data have been published for pairs of
reactors. This can be explained by the fact that the French nuclear program
has been organized with the joint construction of two reactors on the same site.
We tackle this shortcoming of the data by treating each pair of French reactors
as one reactor, with the average capacity of the two and the date when the
latest reactor’s construction is completed as corresponding variables.
In parallel, data on nuclear reactor technical characteristics are collected
from the IAEA Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) database. This
covers the size of the reactor in MWe (Capi), that can be used to test the
existence of economies of scale, the year when the construction of the reactor
starts and the year when the construction is completed. We also collect
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information on nuclear reactor cooling systems and containment structures3,
in order to deﬁne diﬀerent reactor models. Additional data on A-E ﬁrms and
initial operators are collected for the US from the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). For France, these data do not require any speciﬁc access
as EDF has always acted as the A-E ﬁrm and is the sole utility to operate
nuclear reactors.
Based on these reactor level data on technology characteristics and
industrial structure, we consider three main channels through which the
organization of the nuclear industry can reduce cost and/or lead-time: (i) the
standardization of reactor models under construction; (ii) learning by doing
opportunities from past reactors’ construction; and (iii) learning by searching
based on the discounted stock of nuclear speciﬁc patents
2.2.1 Hypotheses on the role of nuclear programs standardization
A number of eﬃciency gains may be expected from the standardization
of nuclear programs. One aspect of standardization explored in the literature
(David and Rothwell, 1996) relates to a trade-oﬀ between the ability to learn
from diversity in nuclear reactors versus learning from similar models . This
dimension of standardization will be covered by the learning opportunities
hypotheses, where learning may be conditional on the level of standardization.
In parallel, one may also argue that standardization beneﬁts can arise
from the diversity of nuclear reactors under-construction. We expect that
a country with low diversity in models of nuclear reactors under-construction
could beneﬁt from coordination gains during the construction period. This can
be motivated by the fact that similar high-tech components will be built during
the same period, such as steam generators or turbines, leading to economies
of scale. Similarly, a low diversity in reactors under-construction also lowers
technological uncertainty. To measure this potential beneﬁt of standardization
during the construction period, we compute a Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index
(HHI) index based on the number of speciﬁc reactor models under-construction
when the construction of reactor starts.
This index is deﬁned according to equation (3) as the sum of the squares of
the market shares of theM reactor models under-construction in country c and
year t. To capture this expected beneﬁt of standardization, we also control for
the number of reactors under-construction (NPP.UCi) as, for instance, a high
HHI could either correspond to a situation where only one reactor is under-
construction or to a situation where multiple and similar reactors are being
built.
3 Data about nuclear reactors cooling system and containment structure are detailed in the
Appendix C
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HHIc,t =
M∑
m=1
s2mtc (3)
2.2.2 Hypotheses on learning by doing opportunities
Because nuclear reactors are complex units, the ability to derive learning
eﬀects may be conditional to the similarities between reactors models and the
A-E which builds reactors. In that respect, we hypothesize that experience
spillovers can take place through two main channels: nuclear reactors
completed by the same A-E ﬁrm (ExpArqi) and nuclear reactors of the same
design completed (ExpMoi).
Furthermore, spillover might also be conditional on the A-E ﬁrm experience
with speciﬁc nuclear design (ExpArqMoi). One could argue that this
corresponds to the second potential beneﬁt of standardization mentioned
above, where the ability to derive learning by doing spillover is conditional on
the standardization path followed by the nuclear industry, and this could be
interpreted an indirect beneﬁt of reactor standardization (David and Rothwell,
1996).
This more restricted level of learning by doing opportunities is deﬁned
following the traditional deﬁnition used in the literature (Irwin and Klenow,
1994). For instance, in equation (4) we consider that country level experience
(ExoCi) can be disentangle into four level of learning spillovers: (i) The
experience of the A-E with the reactor model (ExpArqMoi), (ii) the experience
of the A-E with other models (ExpArqNoMoi), (iii), the experience of other
A-Es with the same model (ExpNoArqMoi) and (iv) the experience of other
A-Es with other models (ExpNoArqNoMoi)
ExpCi = ExpArqMoi+ExpArqNoMoi+ExpNoArqMoi+ExpNoArqNoMoi (4)
2.2.3 Hypotheses on leaning by searching
In parallel to the learning by doing hypothesis, one standard hypothesis
made in the energy economics literature is that learning by doing might not
be the only source of learning. In particular, learning by searching is often
found in many empirical studies dealing with the energy sector e.g., (Larsen
and Sundqvist, 2005); (Erickson and Drennen, 2006) to contribute to cost
reduction. In the case of nuclear power, the impact of innovation activity
on cost remains an empirical question. On one hand, there exists evidence
(Jamasb, 2007) that innovation may contribute to cost reduction. On the other
hand, innovation in nuclear power essentially deals with safety improvements
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because of the role of safety regulation. As such, innovation might lead to
safer, but more complex and more expensive nuclear reactors.
As a proxy for nuclear innovation, we rely on a unique dataset on nuclear
speciﬁc patents, using a discounted stock of priority patent applications. This
discounted stock is set at the country level, reﬂecting the fact that innovation
can originate both from R&D laboratories and nuclear vendors and can be
understood to reﬂect national knowledge capabilities. We set the discount
factor at 10%, a conservative parameter found in many studies on the dynamics
of innovation (Peri, 2005).
2.2.4 Instrument and Control variables
As aforementioned, we also use the expected demand of electricity as
an instrument for lead-time, using the three year trend in future electricity
consumption, and we control for the possibility of structural breaks following
two major nuclear accidents: Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 and Chernobyl
in 1986. Because, the TMI accident took place in the US, we also investigate
for the possibility that this accident has had a heterogeneous eﬀect in the two
countries, with country speciﬁc TMI dummy variables.
Finally, we collect data on prices for two major inputs to the construction
of nuclear reactors: cement and labour force. These data are collected from
the French National Statistics Institute (INSEE) and the US Census Bureau
respectively for the two countries. All the deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics
for our relevant variables are summarized in Table 1 below.
2.3 Stylized facts
Figure 1 below highlights the strong diﬀerences between the trend in
overnight construction costs in France and in the US. In particular, we observe
that over the entire time period the costs have more than doubled in France,
from 920e/MWe in 1980 for the Tricastin 3 and 4 reactors up to 2200e/MWe
in 2000 for the Chooz 1 and 2 reactors. In the US, this increase has been much
more rapid with the cost almost increasing by a factor of 14 from 600e/MWe in
1972 for Turkey Point 3 up to 8500e/MWe in 1989 for the Shoreham reactor.
One can also note that costs have been much more dispersed in the US.
For instance, if we look at nuclear reactors completed in 1986 in the US,
the costs range from 2000e/MWe for Catawba 2 and 6250e/MWe for the
Hope Creek reactor. Since France and the US have experienced important
diﬀerences in terms of industrial structure choices during this period, with more
vertical integration and standardization of nuclear reactor designs for France,
this ﬁgure provides initial suggestions that the French experience has been
more successful in containing the escalation of construction costs. However, to
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CT Cost in e2010/MWe 2282 1.639 599 8571
LT Construction time 8.578 3.507 4.3 23.3
Cap Size in MWe 992.390 201.854 478 1472.5
HHI.Mo Standardization of reac-
tors under-construction
0.230 0.171 0.122 1
Know Discounted stock of nu-
clear patents
582.51 103.96 326.48 903.39
ExpArqMo Experience A-E model
(# reactors)
1.695 2.672 0 14
ExpArqNoMo Experience A-E diﬀ
model(# reactors)
9.867 13.162 0 54
ExpNoArqMo Experience diﬀ A-E
model (# reactors)
2.921 4.073 0 18
ExpNoArqNoMo Experience diﬀ A-E diﬀ
model (# reactors)
27.414 25.731 0 87
Arq.Utility Vertical integration A-E
with utility
0.382 0.487 0 1
Cement Cement cost index 88.019 31.571 36.8 186.556
Labour Labour cost index 247.568 168.027 87.439 921.968
EDem Future electricity de-
mand (3 year trend)
.043 .010 .017 .061
NPP.UC Reactors under-
construction
42.632 20.747 2 69
explain the determinants behind construction costs and establish causality one
has to develop a structural econometric framework, which we do in the next
section.
Figure 1: Nuclear reactors’ overnight construction costs in the US and France
One of the most likely drivers of overnight construction costs is presented in
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Figure 2 below. In this ﬁgure we plot the construction time (in years) of nuclear
reactors in the two countries. One can generally notice that we observe the
same trend as in the previous ﬁgure presenting construction costs: construction
time has increased more rapidly in the US than in France. This can be
understood by the fact that long construction time will generate additional
costs owing to immobilized equipment and labour force. This may also reﬂect
complexity of nuclear design, leading both to more expensive reactors and
longer construction times.
Figure 2: Nuclear reactors’construction lead-time in the US and France
The increase in lead-time still appears to be of a lower magnitude than the
increase in cost. For instance, lead-time in the US ranges from 5 years for the
Vermont Yankee reactor, up to 23.3 years for the Watts Bar 1 reactor, which
represents a 5-fold increase.
Finally, Figure 3 below presents the timing of nuclear reactors construction
(in MWe of new installed capacity) in France and in the US. Although the
US nuclear program was initiated in the early 1960s, about 10 years before
the French program we have excluded the turnkey reactors done in this ﬁrst
decade. The French nuclear program was initiated latter in the early 1970s as
a reaction of the ﬁrst oil shock.
One may also notice that both programs have experienced some important
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Figure 3: Nuclear power installed capacity in MWe
variations over time. For instance, in the US the newly installed capacity
dropped following the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear accident in 1979, which
might be due to ensuing changes in safety regulation. Only two reactors have
been completed in the US since 1990. Popular explanations for this change
have been the counter oil shock of 1986, the liberalization of the US electricity
market during the 1990s which shifted the allocation of construction risks from
the consumers toward electricity producers, along with more stringent safety
regulation.
In France, reactors were built essentially during the 1970s and the 1990s.
Similarly to the case of the US, only two reactors have been completed since
the early 1990s. However, the explanation for the lack of construction of new
nuclear reactors might be somewhat diﬀerent as the share of nuclear power in
the French electricity mix had reached 75% by 2000, leading to lower incentives
to build new reactors.
3 Model specifications and results: France versus the
US
3.1 Model specifications
The simultaneous system of equations used to study construction costs
and lead-time follows a Cobb-Douglas functional form4, taking into account the
4 This functional form that has been extensively used in the literature on nuclear
construction costs e.g. Komanoff (1981); Cantor and Hewlett (1988), McCabe (1996)
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endogeneity of lead-time using expected demand of electricity as an instrument
and controlling for the eﬀects of capacity and input prices. A set of explanatory
variables to identify learning eﬀects are included, as well as the HHI index
for short term standardization and dummy variables to diﬀerentiate projects
managed or not by the utility, to capture the eﬀect of structural breaks due to
major nuclear accidents and to control for temporal and country ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Based on equations (1) and (2), the equations for the baseline model
speciﬁcation are as follows:
ln(CTi) = α0 + α1 ln(LTi) + α2 ln(Capi) + α3 ln(Cement) + α4 ln(Labour)+
α5ArqUtilityi + α6ExpArqMoi + α7ExpArqNoMoi + α8ExpNoArqMoi+
α9ExpNoArqNoMoi + α10HHI.Moi + α11NNP.UC+
α12Tmi.US + α13Tmi.FR+ α14Country + α15Trend+ υi (5)
ln(LTi) = β0 + β1 ln(Capi) + β2ArqUtilityi + β3ExpArqMoi + β4ExpArqNoMoi
+ β5ExpNoArqMoi + β6ExpNoArqNoMoi + β7HHI.Moi
+ β8 ln(EDem) + β9NPP.UC + β10Tmi.US + β11Tmi.FR
+ β12Country + β13Trend+ ǫi (6)
As aforementioned, our empirical strategy follows Rothwell (1986) struc-
tural model which justiﬁes the inclusion of lead-time in the cost equation as an
endogenous variable. In his model, the utility chooses the construction lead-
time to maximize the net present value of the plant and then the constructor
minimizes the costs within this constraint. Moreover, Cantor and Hewlett
(1988) argue that there are unobserved factors captured in the lead-times that
are likely to aﬀect the costs, such as the risks of changes in safety regulations
during construction, or potential rise of hiring expenses due to long delays.
Recall that the HHI.Mo measures the technological diversity in each
country at the moment at which the construction of each reactor began. If
this index is close to one, it means that in that year only one type of reactor
was being built.
3.2 Results
The estimated output for equations (5) and (6) are presented in Tables 2
and 3 below, using four diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. Estimation output of
the cost and lead-time equations in Model 1 represents our baseline estimate.
In this model, we make the hypothesis that learning by doing exists at the
A-E ﬁrm level and for speciﬁc nuclear models. In Model 2, we consider the
possibility of learning by searching in addition to standardization and learning
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by doing. Model 3 focuses on the learning eﬀects at the A-E ﬁrm level, and
we aggregate the experience of the A-E ﬁrm regardless of the reactor model.
Finally, Model 4 considers the experience at the reactor model level, regardless
of the A-E ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst result of our analysis refers to the importance of model
speciﬁcation in identifying signiﬁcant learning eﬀects in the construction of
nuclear power plants. Previous studies account for the experience at the ﬁrm
level as in Model 3 or at the technological level as in Model 4. However as we
can see in Tables 2 and 3, the learning eﬀects are positive and signiﬁcant
only when we take into account solely the experience of A-E ﬁrms with
speciﬁc models of reactor (ExpArqMoi). After taking into account the eﬀect
of ExpArqMoi on lead-time, the point estimate of our baseline model (1)
indicates that when this speciﬁc experience increases by 1%, costs are reduced
by -0.142+1.933*0.009 = 0.124%.
In other words we ﬁnd that, everything being equal, one can expect on
average a 12.4% reduction in construction costs for the second unit of a reactor
model built by the same A-E ﬁrm.
This result is in line with what is expected from the economic literature on
learning eﬀects and recent evidence (Escobar-Rangel and Leveque, 2012) on
the French nuclear ﬂeet and or conﬁrmed using diﬀerent model speciﬁcations as
shown in Appendix A5. From a policy perspective, it is important to highlight
that the beneﬁts that a ﬁrm can derive from standardization in terms of
reduction in construction costs, after building the ﬁrst reactor of a series,
requires long term commitment precisely because the construction of a nuclear
power plant is a lengthy project.
Regarding the learning eﬀects in the lead-time equation, we ﬁnd that
experience in the construction of other models, either of the same ﬁrm
(ExpArqNoMoi) or of others (ExpNoArqNoMoi), has a negative impact on
the construction periods which translates into an increase in the construction
costs. This result shows that, due to the complexity of a nuclear reactor and the
importance of A-E ﬁrms in construction projects, it is not possible to directly
transfer previous knowledge and experience gained on the construction of any
type of reactor to the new projects
This detrimental eﬀect of model diversity also leads to short term beneﬁts
of standardization. The estimate for the HHI.Moi index suggests that an
increase in the diversity of models under construction in a given year (i.e.
HHI smaller than 1), increases construction costs indirectly through lead-time,
5 For robustness tests we consider, in Appendix A, country specific time trends (with
a quadratic term) in order to control, for instance, for time variant changes in safety
regulation in France and the US. We also define the learning by doing variables as 1/(1+X)
instead of ln(X) as both model specifications have been used in the literature (Joskow and
Rose, 1985). Our results remain unchanged
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Table 2: Estimation output of equations (1) and (2)
Model 1 Model 2
Cost Lead-time Cost Lead-time
ln(Capi) -0.769 *** 0.125 ** -0.624 *** 0.125 **
(0.192) (0.053) (0.182) (0.0531)
ln(Cementi) 0.126 0.0882
(0.469) (0.424)
ln(Labouri) -1.375 -0.771
(0.852) (0.806)
ln(LTi) 1.933 *** 1.064 *
(0.580) (0.622)
ExpArqMoi -0.142 *** 0.009 -0.149 *** 0.009
(0.038) (0.011) (0.034) (0.011)
ExpArqNoMoi 0.025 0.026 *** 0.029 0.026 ***
(0.034) (0.009) (0.031) (0.009)
ExpNoArqMoi 0.046 0.010 0.038 0.010
(0.039) (0.012) (0.035) (0.012)
ExpNoArqNoMoi -0.068 0.141 *** -0.039 0.141 ***
(0.096) (0.017) (0.087) (0.017)
Knowi 1.416 ***
(0.522)
HHI.Moi 0.454 -0.566 *** 0.374 -0.566 ***
(0.537) (0.160) (0.485) (0.160)
NPP.UCi 0.313 *** -0.071 ** 0.324 *** -0.071 **
(0.117) (0.034) (0.105) (0.034)
ArqUtilityi -0.256 *** 0.009 -0.285 *** 0.009
(0.093) (0.028) (0.085) (0.028)
ln(EDemi) -1.235 *** -1.235 ***
(0.113) (0.113)
Tmi.US -0.058 0.272 *** 0.115 0.272 ***
(0.184) (0.0431) (0.179) (0.043)
Tmi.FR -0.015 -0.028 -0.064 -0.028
(0.246) (0.074) (0.223) (0.074)
CH -0.077 0.058 * -0.030 0.058 *
(0.123) (0.031) (0.113) (0.031)
Constant 6.420 ** -2.347 *** -4.182 -2.347 ***
(2.915) (0.448) (4.767) (0.448)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend + trend2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 128 128 128 128
Adj. R2 0.833 0.955 0.866 0.955
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Table 3: Estimation output of equations (1) and (2)
Model 3 Model 4
Cost Lead-time Cost Lead-time
ln(Capi) -0.680 *** 0.121 ** -0.716 *** 0.102 **
(0.196) (0.052) (0.191) (0.048)
ln(Cementi) 0.038 0.070
(0.480) (0.457)
ln(Labouri) -1.183 -1.071
(0.883) (0.722)
ln(LTi) 1.910 *** 1.808 ***
(0.605) (0.499)
ln(ExpArq) -0.049 0.030 ***
(0.037) (0.010)
ln.ExpNoArq -0.068 0.139 ***
(0.098) (0.016)
ln.ExpMo -0.055 0.018 **
(0.034) (0.008)
ln.ExpNoMo -0.061 0.164 ***
(0.093) (0.016)
HHI.Mo 0.599 -0.575 *** 0.619 -0.231 *
(0.556) (0.158) (0.560) (0.139)
ln.NPP.UC 0.332 ***-0.0751 ** 0.337 *** -0.076 **
(0.123) (0.033) (0.114) (0.030)
Arq.Utility -0.319 *** 0.012 -0.253 *** -0.010
(0.095) (0.027) (0.082) (0.022)
ln.Demand -1.228 *** -1.228 ***
(0.111) (0.100)
Tmi.US -0.102 0.285 *** -0.116 0.293 ***
(0.193) (0.041) (0.198) (0.038)
Tmi.FR 0.051 -0.020 0.085 -0.228 ***
(0.255) (0.073) (0.276) (0.069)
CH -0.060 0.065 ** 0.004 0.046 *
(0.129) (0.030) (0.124) (0.027)
Constant 5.281 * -2.295 *** 5.067 * -2.313 ***
(3.015) (0.443) (2.799) (0.396)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend + trend2 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 128 128 128 128
Adj. R2 0.815 0.955 0.820 0.962
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considering that lead-time is found to have a strong and signiﬁcant impact on
costs.
This result can be explained by the fact that when the diversity of nuclear
reactors is high, the nuclear safety authority has to assess the potential risks
of diﬀerent models of reactors which prevents rapid monitoring and licensing
procedures, due to the heterogeneity in demand which could lead to supply
chain constraints and construction delays. As such, it is rational to ﬁnd that
this short term eﬀect impacts primarily the lead-time equation.
Given the nature of these three results, one may argue that the lack
of standardization harms the competitiveness of nuclear power in two ways.
Firstly, it reduces the potential gains in terms of costs savings in the long term,
through learning by doing at the ﬁrm level. Secondly, it tends to increase the
construction lead-times and therefore the construction costs in the short term.
In addition, the results highlight positive and signiﬁcant economies of scale.
Indeed, we ﬁnd that larger nuclear reactors take longer to build but are also
cheaper per MWe. The net eﬀect on cost can be derived from oﬀsetting the
direct eﬀect on cost with the indirect eﬀect on lead-time. For instance, Model
1 indicates a net impact of -0.769+(1.933*0.125)= -0.527. This coeﬃcient can
be interpreted as an elasticity, meaning that a 10% increase in size reduces
construction costs by 5.27%.
With respect to the role of A-E ﬁrms, we also show that when a utility
takes the A-E ﬁrm responsibility, construction costs are lower than when a
project is managed by another ﬁrm. This result has been identiﬁed in previous
studies (e.g. Cantor and Hewlett (1988) and McCabe (1996)) and it can be
understood by the fact that a vertically integrated utility reduces potential
asymmetric information problems between the utility and the ﬁrms involved
in the construction of nuclear reactors, leading to cost reductions.
In Table 2 we also present the results for Model 2, which in addition
to the variables in Model 1 includes the discounted stock of priority
patent applications (Knowi) in order to capture the eﬀect of innovation
on construction costs. The positive estimate found is contradictory to the
pattern observed in many energy technologies, such as other renewable energy
sources (Erickson and Drennen, 2006). This can be explained by the fact that
innovation has been driven by the requirements of nuclear safety authorities
(Berthélemy, 2012a), leading to improvements in the safety performance of
existing reactors (Berthélemy, 2012b).
In other words, this highlights the long term trade-oﬀ faced by the
nuclear power sector: on the one hand innovation is needed to reduce the
externalities associated with nuclear accident risks; on the other hand this
innovation hampers the competitiveness of nuclear power through an increase
in construction costs.
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One can also note that this result is contrary to the initial ﬁndings of
Jamasb (2007) who relies on data extracted from energy modelling tools.
Hence, from a methodological perspective this result stresses the necessity
of looking at real cost data before drawing policy conclusions on energy
technologies costs trajectories.
Finally, it is important to analyze the eﬀect of the major nuclear accidents
in our system of equations. As we can see in Table 3, the impact on the
construction costs both in the US and in France due to TMI and Chernobyl
(CH) came indirectly from an increase in lead-time. Logically, TMI primarily
impacted the US where this reactor was located and had no signiﬁcant impact
on France. Chernobyl, which took place in the Ukraine, had a positive and
signiﬁcant impact, albeit at the 10% level, on lead-time in the two countries.
This result suggests that closer monitoring from nuclear safety authorities
following these accidents resulted in delays in the construction of the reactors
installed afterwards.
4 Nuclear reactors lead-time: Insights from other
OECD countries
Given the close relationship between the construction costs and lead-
time and the importance of the latter in nuclear power future deployment,
in this section we further investigate the impact of capacity, experience and
standardization on lead-time using a larger dataset on nuclear reactors from
6 OECD countries. Our aim is to gain some insights into the construction of
other nuclear ﬂeets for which cost information is not available, and to identify
if the results from the US and the French experience also apply to other OECD
countries which have followed diﬀerent paths in terms of technological choices
and industrial structure.
4.1 The role of lead-time under liberalized electricity markets
As shown in the previous section, the increase in construction lead-times
has been one of the main drivers of the capital costs escalation in nuclear
power both in the US and France. However, in addition to the eﬀect on
construction costs, an increase in lead-times also means a delay in revenues
for the investors and an increase in the interim interest rates. This gives
lead-time a stronger role in the competitiveness of nuclear power in liberalized
electricity markets where revenues for nuclear reactors’ operators are derived
from wholesale markets and not from rates of return regulation.
In addition, from a microeconomic perspective, private investors tend to
employ higher discount rates than those used for public infrastructure. This
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implies that one might prefer to build a CCGT gas plant that can be planned
and built in 2 years and be willing to face the fossil fuel and carbon price
risk, instead of waiting more than 7 years (in the best case scenario) to start
recovering their investments (MacKerron, 2004). In addition, the uncertainty
of longer construction periods increases the diﬃculty of ﬁnancing new nuclear
capacity in liberalized electricity market (Nuttall and Taylor, 2009); (Kessides,
2012) due to possible cost overruns.
Furthermore, in liberalized electricity markets the private option value
that carbon-free nuclear power generation could bring, as a hedge against
changes in gas or CO2 emissions, will most likely disappear because of the
strong correlation between electricity, gas and carbon prices (F Roques and
de Neufville, 2006).
Nuclear reactors lead-time can also have some macroeconomic implications,
in particular if one also considers the pre-construction period necessary to
receive the authorization to build a reactor, which means that a nuclear
project can take between 10 to 15 years between the start of the planning
process and the end of construction. In this sense, the risk of delays in the
construction process might encourage a wait-and-see policy, as by the time the
new nuclear power plant starts generating electricity it would be reasonable to
expect alternative technologies to have reduced their costs and become more
competitive.
4.2 Data and Model
The data used are also extracted from the Power Reactor Information
System (PRIS) database developed by the IAEA . Similarly to the previous
section, lead-time is computed as the diﬀerence in years between the
construction and grid dates, and commercial reactors in 6 OECD countries
are considered: the US, France, Canada, South Korea, Japan and the UK.
Note that contrary to the previous section, we can make full use of the French
data as, contrary to costs data, lead-time is available at the reactor level.
Figure 4 and Table 4 below highlight that the heterogeneity across our
sample is substantial. This feature is understandable given the diﬀerences
between countries and across years, in terms of labour productivity, regulatory
licensing process, stage of development of construction techniques, etc. To
capture these eﬀects, we have included in our model a ﬁxed eﬀect for each
country as well as a time trend and a quadratic term for the time trend.
In the next table, we present the means for the explanatory variables that
we have chosen to use in our regression model. As we can see, diﬀerences in
the lead-time means between the Western and Asian countries are substantial.
For Japan and South Korea the construction of a new reactor took only 4 years
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!Figure 4: Nuclear reactors’ construction lead-time in OCDE countries
approximately, whereas in the US or in the UK took more than the double,
even when the average size of the reactors is similar.
Table 4: Mean for the explanatory variables
Obs. LT ExpArqMo HHI Cap
(in year) (#reactors) (index) (in MWe)
France 58 6.45 9.13 0.472 1083
Canada 22 7.07 2.29 0.361 687
South Korea 23 4.90 4.04 0.672 895.3
Japan 50 4.10 3 0.341 919.1
U.K 17 8.63 4.80 0.861 645.1
U.S 98 9.27 2.10 0.152 972.4
All Countries 291 7.41 4.12 0.378 934.4
Table 4 presents the average of the explanatory variable used in the
regression. Diﬀerences in the lead-time average between Western and Asian
countries are substantial. For Japan and South Korea the construction of a
new reactor took only approximately 4 years, whereas in the US or in the UK
it took more than twice as long, even when the average size of the reactors was
similar. Important heterogeneity can also be observed for short termHHI.Moi
and long term ExpArqMoi average level of standardization.
In Table 5 below we present the estimates similar to equation (4.6) in
Section 3. We have also included nameplate capacity, electricity demand
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and the structural break dummies as controls. Two model speciﬁcations are
considered, the second one introduces time ﬁxed eﬀects. Other robustness tests
can also be found in Appendix B6.
Table 5: Regression results for lead-time with experience and the HHI index
(1) (2)
Variables (lnLT ) (lnLT )
HHI.Moi -0.291 ** -0.472 ***
(0.135) (0.182)
lnCapi 0.395 *** 0.254 ***
(0.052) (0.052)
ExpArqMoi 0.019 -0.008
(0.032) (0.029)
lnEDemi -16.970 *** -21.219 ***
(2.866) (3.265)
lnNPP.UCi -0.020 -0.054
(0.033) (0.047)
Tmi.US 0.432 ** 0.439 ***
(0.044) (0.062)
Tmi.Abroad 0.139 *** 0.142 **
(0.054) (0.061)
Cherno 0.188 *** 0.214 ***
(0.029) (0.027)
Constant 1.105 *** 1.977
(0.402) (0.440)
Country FE Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes
Trend + Trend2 Yes No
Obs. 286 286
Adj. R2 0.840 0.869
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
These estimates show that increasing the size of the reactor has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on lead-time. On average we have found an increase of
3% when scaling up by 10%. This result conﬁrms the importance of oﬀsetting
the scale eﬀects in the cost equation, as although increasing the size of the
reactor means lower costs per MWe, the net eﬀect should take into account
the increase in the lead-time.
This model also conﬁrms the insights from the previous section in terms
of our HHI diversity index. Recall that high values of this index mean more
market concentration, which in our case corresponds to a more standardized
nuclear ﬂeet. On the basis of the analysis using the lead-time, there is strong
and signiﬁcant evidence that reducing the diversity of the nuclear ﬂeet is one
of the major diﬀerences between countries with longer lead-times and those
6 In Appendix B we consider the four learning spillovers channels used in Section 3 and also
define them both as 1/(1 +X) and ln(X). The results remain unchanged
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with shorter construction periods.
One can also notice the negative eﬀect of the two major nuclear accidents
on the construction lead-time. Both TMI and Chernobyl were found to be
signiﬁcant structural breaks, showing that these events have an inﬂuence
beyond borders. As expected, the eﬀect of TMI is stronger on the US compared
to other countries.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the short and long term beneﬁts of nuclear reactor
standardization on the construction costs of nuclear reactors in the US and
France between 1966 and 2002 using overnight construction costs data. Short
term beneﬁts are deﬁned as the gains based on the diversity of nuclear reactors
under construction, whereas long term beneﬁts represent learning by doing
spillovers from similar reactors. We build a system of equations to control
for endogeneity between costs and lead-time, using the expected demand of
electricity as an instrument for lead-time and control for input prices and the
possibility of structural breaks following major nuclear accidents.
We show that short term gains from standardization have a positive impact
on construction costs through a reduction in lead-time, the latter being one
of the main drivers of construction costs in France and the US. This result is
also conﬁrmed for a range of other OECD countries with heterogeneous nuclear
programs, and can be explained by the fact that the diversity of nuclear reactor
models can lead to delays owing to supply line constraints or delays due to
increased workload for the nuclear safety regulator. From a policy perspective,
as liberalized electricity markets will tend to apply higher discount rates to
nuclear new-build projects appraisal, we further argue that standardization of
nuclear reactors will be a key criterion for the economic competitiveness of
merchant nuclear reactors.
At the same time, we demonstrate that learning by doing spillovers are
also conditional on the standardization of nuclear programs, considering that
learning by doing spillovers only take place through reactors of the same model
built by the same Architect-Engineer (A-E) ﬁrm. Regarding the role of the
A-E ﬁrm, we also show that vertical integration of the utility and the A-E
ﬁrm reduces construction costs, which can be explained by a reduction in the
asymmetric information of the utility regarding costs.
Conversely, if we stress that lead-time contributes to construction costs
reduction and has a stronger impact under liberalized electricity markets, this
result may change for other determinants of construction costs. For example,
we ﬁnd evidence of economies of scale for construction costs, whereas from
an investment perspective C Gollier and Walgenwitz (2005) show that Small
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and Medium Reactors (SMRs) will generate a signiﬁcant option value when
electricity prices are uncertain. In other words, investors may have to trade-oﬀ
the economic gains associated with economies of scale for large reactors with
the option value of SMRs. This calls for more research on the optimal size of
nuclear reactors.
In parallel, we also ﬁnd that the discounted stock of patents in the
nuclear industry increases construction costs, reﬂecting the fact that innovation
increases the complexity of nuclear reactors. This result is in direct contrast to
the pattern in other energy technologies where technical progress contributes to
costs reductions, and can be explained by the importance of safety regulation
in the nuclear power sector which improves safety performance (Berthélemy,
2012b), at the expense of increases in construction costs. This result is not
without implications for the design of energy economics modelling tools, as the
existing literature has shown that certain models’ calibration (Jamasb, 2007)
implicitly assumes that nuclear construction costs beneﬁt from innovation
eﬀort. This result highlights the importance of building these models on
evidence based on actual cost data.
However, even if our results highlight the beneﬁt of nuclear programs
standardization and suggest that innovation eﬀort contributes to costs
increases, they do not answer the question of the optimal pace of technological
change in nuclear power technologies. In other words, there exists a trade-
oﬀ between reductions in costs permitted by standardization and potential
gains from adopting new technologies with better operating and safety
performance. In addition, using patent data as a measure of innovation
captures incremental innovation but fails to consider the possibility of radical
technological change. In that respect, nuclear power has been characterized
by incremental innovations from initial reactor designs in the 1950s. Radical
innovations such as 4th generation of nuclear reactors could, on the other hand,
contribute to costs reductions.
It is also important to note that safety regulation can impact construction
costs and lead-time through dimensions other than technological change. In
particular, the scope of standardization partly depends on the evolution of the
safety rules in each country. This is reported to be the case in the US where,
according to Cooper (2010), the increase in safety regulations issued by the
NRC grew substantially following TMI (e.g. from three safety guidelines in
1970 to 143 by 1978), limiting the ability of nuclear vendors to standardize
nuclear reactors as they had to comply with changes in safety rules.
Hence, the US experience shows that safety regulation can have important
consequences on the economic competitiveness of nuclear reactors. In that
respect, standardization and safety regulation do not have to be per-se
incompatible and one could argue that for a given level of safety eﬀort, nuclear
safety regulation should be designed in order to allow nuclear reactors to beneﬁt
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more from standardization gains.
This would necessitate institutional reforms. One possibility would be to
reinforce nuclear reactor certiﬁcation procedures through cooperation between
national nuclear authorities, meaning that a nuclear reactor design can be
certiﬁed jointly in several countries. This would represent a change from
the current regulatory framework where each national safety authority issues
design certiﬁcation with its own speciﬁcation requests and diﬀerent timeframes.
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Appendix A Robustness checks for the model of
costs and lead-times
Table 6: Alternative model speciﬁcations for Equations (5) and (6)
Model 5 Model 6
Cost Lead-time Cost Lead-time
HHI.Mo 1.249 ** -0.400 *** 0.247 -0.444 **
(0.490) (0.141) (0.481) (0.185)
lnExpArqMo -0.153 *** 0.005
(0.041) (0.011)
lnExpArqNoMo 0.028 0.024 **
(0.035) (0.009)
lnExpNoArqMo 0.0461 0.014
(0.041) (0.011)
lnExpNoArqNoMo -0.095 0.152 ***
(0.103) (0.017)
Inv.ExpArqMo 0.335 *** -0.025
(0.067) (0.027)
Inv.ExpArqNoMo -0.097 -0.007
(0.080) (0.032)
Inv.ExpNoArqMo -0.150 * -0.016
(0.079) (0.032)
Inv.ExpNoArqNoMo 0.181 -0.337 ***
(0.245) (0.076)
lnKnow 1.291 **
(0.598)
lnCap -0.839 *** 0.117 ** -0.609 *** 0.174 ***
(0.221) (0.050) (0.182) (0.061)
lnNPP.UC 0.498 *** -0.101 ** 0.318 *** -0.040
(0.182) (0.043) (0.105) (0.040)
Arq.Utility -0.255 *** -0.008 -0.292 *** 0.024
(0.096) (0.027) (0.087) (0.034)
lnEDem -1.202 *** -1.467 ***
(0.108) (0.125)
lnLT 2.270 *** 1.133 *
(0.820) (0.686)
lnCement 0.392 0.003
(0.538) (0.359)
lnLabour -2.020 -0.710
(1.365) (0.808)
Tmi.US -0.055 0.292 *** 0.075 0.300 ***
(0.197) (0.041) (0.177) (0.049)
Tmi.FR -0.001 -0.053 -0.184 -0.004
(0.252) (0.071) (0.223) (0.089)
CH -0.107 0.053 * -0.051 0.053
(0.140) (0.030) (0.122) (0.036)
Constant 7.841 * -2.220 *** -3.776 -3.056 ***
(4.597) (0.428) (5.726) (0.507)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country speciﬁc trend + trend2 Yes Yes No No
Trend + trend2 No No Yes Yes
Obs. 128 128 128 128
Adj. R2 0.823 0.960 0.873 0.940
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Appendix B Robustness checks for the model of
lead-times
Table 7: Alternative model speciﬁcations for lead-time in OECD countries
(1) (2)
Variables (lnLT ) (lnLT )
HHI.Mo -0.509 *** -0.458 **
(0.189) (0.200)
lnCap 0.225 *** 0.240 ***
(0.051) (0.052)
lnExpArqMo -0.010
(0.031)
lnExpArqNoMo 0.0411 ***
(0.013)
lnExpNoArqMo 0.0141
(0.018)
lnExpNoArqNoMo 0.080 *
(0.041)
Inv.ExpArqMo 0.0514
(0.111)
Inv.ExpArqNoMo 0.003
(0.032)
Inv.ExpNoArqMo 0.009
(0.048)
Inv.ExpNoArqNoMo -0.238
(0.163)
lnEDem -17.010 *** -21.240 ***
(3.857) (3.387)
Tmi.Abroad 0.126 * 0.124 *
(0.066) (0.069)
Tmi.US 0.432 *** 0.448 ***
(0.060) (0.062)
CH 0.214 *** 0.214 ***
(0.029) (0.027)
Constant 2.111 *** 2.542 ***
(0.450) (0.576)
Country FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Obs. 286 286
Adj. R2 0.876 0.872
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Appendix C Technical characteristics
Table 8: List of nuclear reactor models by manufacturer in France and the US
Model Manufacturer Number of reactors built
B W (L-loop) DRYAMB Babcock
Wilcox 9
BWR-3 General Electric 1
BWR-41 General Electric 15
BWR-42 General Electric 4
BWR-5 General Electric 5
BWR-6 General Electric 4
CE (2-loop) DRYAMB Combustion Engineering 13
COMB CE80 DRYAMB Combustion Engineering 2
CP0 Areva 6
CP1 Areva 18
CP2 Areva 10
N4 Areva 4
P4 Areva 8
P’4 Areva 12
W (2-loop) DRYAMB Westinghouse 3
W (3-loop) DRYAMB Westinghouse 8
W (3-loop) DRYSUB Westinghouse 4
W (4-loop) DRYAMB Westinghouse 21
W (4-loop) DRYSUB Westinghouse 1
W (4-loop) ICECND Westinghouse 9
Total 157
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